TL;DR. Value-based pricing is usually taught as a mindset; here it is an eight-line worksheet. The default habit is cost: in Eurosystem surveys covering more than 11,000 euro area firms, the GDP-weighted shares were 54% pricing as a mark-up over costs and 27% following competitors’ prices. The worksheet converts an outcome into money a client can verify. In CEOtudent’s analysis of NYU Stern data for January 2026, $100,000 of extra revenue is worth $2,290 of pre-tax operating profit at the average margin of listed US grocery retailers and $32,980 at the average margin of software companies. An hour of a bookkeeping clerk’s time costs an employer about $33.61 once benefits are added. Run through the worksheet, a $400,000 revenue-lift project supports a fee of about $37,500, not the $120,000 a “10% of the revenue lift” shortcut suggests. A small automation project supports $11,637, and less if fewer saved hours turn into savings. CEO move: write the outcome definition and walk-away price before the sales call. Student move: log every quote, result and win or loss, then recalibrate.
This piece is the practical companion to two CEOtudent guides. Freelance Pricing Models Compared sets out when value-based pricing fits at all, and The Leverage Ladder explains why moving from selling time to selling outcomes matters. This article covers the arithmetic. It assumes you know your cost floor; if not, start with how to convert a salary into a freelance rate.
How do firms actually set prices?
Central bank surveys are the best large-sample evidence on price setting. They cover firms’ main products, not professional services, but they describe the habits of the businesses a consultant sells to.
Table 1. How firms say they set prices (verified survey data)
| Survey | Sample | Cost-based | Competitor-based | Market or value-based |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bank of England (Hall, Walsh and Yates), first preferences (several allowed) | 654 UK companies, autumn 1995 | 37% (20% variable mark-up, 17% fixed mark-up) | 25% | 39% “highest level that the market could bear” |
| Eurosystem survey (Fabiani et al.), GDP-weighted | More than 11,000 firms surveyed in nine euro area countries, 2003 and 2004 (this question reported for seven) | 54% mark-up | 27% | 18% “other” |
| Bank of England (Greenslade and Parker), rated “very important” | 693 UK firms, December 2007 to February 2008 | 32.9% variable mark-up; 24.7% fixed mark-up | 32.6% | Not offered as an option |
| Studies published 1983 to 2006 (Hinterhuber and Bertini, as summarised by Steinbrenner and Turčínková, 2021) | Literature review | 37% | 44% | 17% customer value-oriented |
Sources: Hall, Walsh and Yates (1997), Bank of England Working Paper No. 67, Table A; Fabiani et al. (2005), ECB Working Paper No. 535, Table 4; Greenslade and Parker (2010), Bank of England Working Paper No. 395, Table 6; Steinbrenner and Turčínková (2021). Figures as printed.
Size. In the 1995 UK survey, 27% of small firms put a fixed mark-up first and 20% a variable mark-up, against 32% for the market level. The authors suggest the mark-up rule of thumb suits small companies “which cannot afford expensive market research”. A worksheet is a cheap substitute.
Wording. The only one of the three surveys that offered “the highest level that the market could bear” as an answer found it the most common top preference, at 39%. The later UK survey dropped the option; its authors note that market-based and cost-plus answers “need not be distinct”. Charging what the market will bear is often an unwritten guess at value.
Belief versus practice. The abstract of Hinterhuber’s 2008 study states that “more than 80 percent of companies continue to price their products and services primarily on the basis of costs and/or competitive price levels”. His survey of 81 executives lists “deficits in value assessment” first among five obstacles. The worksheet below targets that obstacle.
Evidence that value-based pricing pays is encouraging, not conclusive. Liozu and Hinterhuber (2013) surveyed 1,812 pricing professionals and report “a positive relationship between value-based pricing (but not competition-based pricing) and firm performance”, using cross-sectional, self-reported data. Ingenbleek, Frambach and Verhallen (2013), surveying 144 companies, found value-informed pricing raised price level and market performance, but warn that “in many cases engaging in value-informed pricing is not enough”.
The CEOtudent Value-Price Formula
The formula has one core line, fed by eight steps:
Fee = Reference price + Capture share x (Your expected value – Alternative’s expected value)
Your expected value = Annual value x Annuity factor x Probability of success x Attribution share.
The logic is economic value estimation as set out by Hinterhuber (2004), building on Nagle and Holden: a product’s economic value “is the price of the customer’s best alternative” (the reference value) “plus the value of whatever differentiates the offering from the alternative” (the differentiation value). The client’s best alternative sets the starting point; your extra value over it is what you share.
Table 2. The fill-in worksheet (CEOtudent editorial framework)
| Line | What you fill in | Formula | Where the number comes from |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Outcome: one metric, baseline, target, measurement window, data source | Written, agreed with the client | The client’s own reports |
| 2 | Annual value to the client (G) | Revenue gain x contribution margin; or hours saved x loaded hourly cost x realization rate; or (probability of loss before – after) x size of loss | Client data, checked against Tables 3 and 4 |
| 3 | Years (n), discount rate (r), annuity factor (AF) | AF = (1 – (1 + r) to the power -n) / r; present value PV = G x AF | Client’s cost of capital, or the industry figure in Table 3 |
| 4 | Probability of success (p), attribution share (a) | Expected value E = PV x p x a | Your track record and the project plan |
| 5 | Reference price (R) and the alternative’s expected value (E alt) | Differentiation value D = E – E alt; economic value to client = R + D | The client’s real next-best option, including doing nothing |
| 6 | Capture share (s) | Fee F = R + s x D | Editorial range, see below |
| 7 | Cost floor and budget ceiling | Floor = your hours x your floor rate; ceiling = the lower of the client’s budget and R + D | Your rate floor; the client’s approval limit |
| 8 | Log entry | Quote, inputs, win or loss, measured result | Your pricing log |
Line 3 assumes equal amounts at each year end. If the next-best option is doing nothing, the fee is a plain share of your expected value.
What is $100,000 of extra revenue worth to a client?
Line 2 is where a value-based quote is easiest to inflate. A promise of more revenue is really a promise of profit, and how much profit depends on the client’s cost structure. Gross margin is a generous reading: it assumes extra revenue brings only extra cost of goods. Operating margin is a cautious reading: it assumes every cost grows with revenue. The client’s contribution margin on extra sales should normally sit between the two, and the client’s own figure beats any average.
Table 3. What $100,000 of extra revenue is worth, by client industry (CEOtudent analysis of Damodaran, January 2026)
| Client industry (US) | Firms | Gross margin | Pre-tax operating margin | Worth at gross margin | Worth at operating margin | Cost of capital |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Software (System & Application) | 309 | 71.72% | 32.98% | $71,720 | $32,980 | 9.34% |
| Restaurant/Dining | 64 | 32.24% | 15.79% | $32,240 | $15,790 | 7.16% |
| Machinery | 105 | 37.47% | 15.86% | $37,470 | $15,860 | 7.70% |
| Education | 32 | 45.82% | 14.01% | $45,820 | $14,010 | 6.75% |
| Hospitals/Healthcare Facilities | 31 | 39.10% | 13.36% | $39,100 | $13,360 | 6.19% |
| Business & Consumer Services | 155 | 33.38% | 12.27% | $33,380 | $12,270 | 7.23% |
| Retail (Special Lines) | 94 | 35.30% | 7.73% | $35,300 | $7,730 | 8.01% |
| Computer Services | 64 | 24.26% | 7.41% | $24,260 | $7,410 | 7.83% |
| Engineering/Construction | 48 | 15.46% | 6.49% | $15,460 | $6,490 | 8.69% |
| Retail (Grocery and Food) | 15 | 26.31% | 2.29% | $26,310 | $2,290 | 7.24% |
| Total market excluding financials | 4,822 | 34.39% | 13.14% | $34,390 | $13,140 | 7.72% |
Source: Aswath Damodaran, NYU Stern School of Business, Operating and Net Margins by Sector (US) and Cost of Equity and Capital (US), data as of January 2026 (most recent update 9 January 2026). Margins are aggregated across listed US companies; “pre-tax operating margin” is the pre-tax unadjusted operating margin. The “worth” columns are CEOtudent calculations.
- The same revenue promise is worth very different amounts. At operating margin, $100,000 of extra revenue is worth 14.4 times more to the average software company than to the average grocery retailer; at gross margin the gap is 2.7 times. The same fee for the same revenue lift in both industries misprices at least one of them.
- Revenue-share pricing overstates value. Even at gross margin, a dollar of extra revenue is worth between 15 and 72 cents across these ten industries.
- Keep the worksheet pre-tax. Margins, gains and your fee are all pre-tax from the client’s side, since a consulting fee is normally a business expense.
These are listed-company averages. Use them to test the client’s figure: a contribution margin above the industry’s gross margin needs an explanation.
What is an hour of saved time worth?
For cost-saving work, Line 2 converts hours into money using pay plus what the employer spends on top of pay. The salary-to-freelance-rate guide breaks the second part down; one ratio is enough here. In June 2026, employers of full-time private-industry workers spent $54.00 per hour worked in total, of which $36.97 was wages and salaries and $4.40 paid leave: about $1.31 of total cost for every $1 of pay.
Table 4. Loaded cost of an hour saved, selected occupations (CEOtudent analysis of BLS OEWS May 2025 and ECEC June 2026)
| Occupation | Mean hourly wage, May 2025 | Loaded cost per hour (x 1.3053) | Value of 1,000 hours saved |
|---|---|---|---|
| Customer service representatives | $22.40 | $29.24 | $29,239 |
| Bookkeeping, accounting, and auditing clerks | $25.75 | $33.61 | $33,611 |
| Paralegals and legal assistants | $33.51 | $43.74 | $43,740 |
| Market research analysts and marketing specialists | $43.03 | $56.17 | $56,167 |
| Accountants and auditors | $45.56 | $59.47 | $59,469 |
| General and operations managers | $64.87 | $84.67 | $84,674 |
| Software developers | $71.20 | $92.94 | $92,937 |
| All occupations | $33.54 | $43.78 | $43,780 |
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics, May 2025, Table 1 (released 15 May 2026); Employer Costs for Employee Compensation, June 2026 (released 9 September 2026). Multiplier = 54.00 / (36.97 + 4.40) = 1.3053, an approximation: it applies one all-worker ratio to every occupation and slightly understates the cost of an hour actually worked.
Read alone, the value column is a trap. Saved hours are worth money only if they become lower spending (less overtime, fewer temporary staff, a vacancy left unfilled) or output the client values. Hence the worksheet’s realization rate: the share of freed hours that becomes measurable savings. Set it with the client.
Which discount rate, and how much does it matter?
The client’s cost of capital is the natural discount rate; if the client does not know it, use the industry figure in Table 3, which runs from 6.19% to 9.34% across the ten industries shown. Keep risk in the probability line, not in the discount rate: raising the rate for doubt and also multiplying by a probability of success charges the client twice for the same risk.
A published case shows the arithmetic. Hinterhuber (2004) describes a Japanese equipment maker whose standard model sold in its home market at the equivalent of US$80,000, against US$50,000 for a similar model from its main US competitor. For a printing-ink customer, the maker estimated net benefits of US$120,000 a year; discounted at 8% over a four-year equipment life, the differentiation value “amounts to well over US$300,000”. Recomputed as a four-year annuity, the present value is $397,455, so the $30,000 premium captures 7.5% of it. One case is not a benchmark.
Worked example A: a revenue-lift project
A specialty online retailer with about $8 million in annual sales wants to rebuild its abandoned-cart and win-back email program. The outcome is incremental revenue from program emails, measured against a holdout group that receives none, which gives the client a baseline it can check. Every input except the discount rate is an illustrative assumption.
Table 5. Worked example A (CEOtudent editorial framework; inputs are illustrative assumptions unless a source is named)
| Line | Item | Input | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Outcome | Incremental revenue against a holdout group, measured quarterly for 3 years (illustrative assumption) | Agreed in writing |
| 2 | Annual revenue lift | $400,000 (illustrative assumption) | |
| 2 | Contribution margin on extra orders | 30% (illustrative assumption; inside Damodaran’s 7.73% to 35.30% range for Retail (Special Lines)) | Annual value $120,000 |
| 3 | Years and discount rate | 3 years (illustrative assumption); 8.01% (Damodaran cost of capital, Retail (Special Lines)) | Annuity factor 2.5766; present value $309,196 |
| 4 | Probability of success and attribution | 60% and 70% (illustrative assumptions) | Expected value $129,862 |
| 5 | Next-best alternative | Email platform’s own setup service: price $15,000, expected value $40,000 (illustrative assumptions) | Differentiation value $89,862; economic value to client $104,862 |
| 6 | Capture share | 25% (illustrative assumption, inside the editorial range) | Fee $15,000 + 25% x $89,862 = $37,466 |
| 7 | Floor and ceiling | 140 hours x $150 floor rate = $21,000; client budget $60,000 (illustrative assumptions) | Passes: 1.78 times the floor, below the $60,000 ceiling |
Quoted as $37,500, the fee works out at about $268 per hour, a result rather than the basis of the price. The client expects to keep $92,397 after paying you, against $25,000 net from the alternative. Its $67,397 advantage, the 75% of differentiation value left with it, belongs in the proposal.
Compare a common shortcut: “ten percent of the value” applied to three years of revenue ($1.2 million) gives $120,000, 3.2 times the worksheet fee, which is 3.1% of the headline revenue. The gap is the margin conversion and the risk adjustment.
Worked example B: a cost-saving automation project
A 40-person professional services firm processes supplier invoices by hand. You propose an AI-assisted intake and matching workflow. The outcome is clerk hours per month on invoices, from the time-tracking system, plus duplicate payments caught.
Table 6. Worked example B (CEOtudent editorial framework; inputs are illustrative assumptions unless a source is named)
| Line | Item | Input | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | Hours saved | 3 clerks x 8 hours a week x 48 weeks (illustrative assumptions) | 1,152 hours a year |
| 2 | Loaded hourly cost | $25.75 mean wage for bookkeeping, accounting, and auditing clerks (BLS, May 2025) x 1.3053 (ECEC, June 2026) | $33.61 |
| 2 | Realization rate | 60% (illustrative assumption) | Labor value $23,232 a year |
| 2 | Risk reduction | Chance of a duplicate payment falls from 5% to 1% a year on a $50,000 exposure (illustrative assumptions) | $2,000 a year |
| 2 | Annual value | $25,232 | |
| 3 | Years and discount rate | 2 years (illustrative assumption); 7.23% (Damodaran, Business & Consumer Services) | Annuity factor 1.8023; present value $45,475 |
| 4 | Probability of success and attribution | 85% and 90% (illustrative assumptions) | Expected value $34,788 |
| 5 | Next-best alternative | Off-the-shelf payables software, two years: price $7,200, expected value $20,000 (illustrative assumptions) | Differentiation value $14,788 |
| 6 | Capture share | 30% (illustrative assumption) | Fee $7,200 + 30% x $14,788 = $11,637 |
| 7 | Floor and ceiling | 70 hours x $150 = $10,500; client budget $15,000 (illustrative assumptions) | Passes, but only 1.11 times the floor |
Change one input. If only 40% of freed hours become savings, annual value falls to $17,488, the differentiation value to $4,111, and the fee to $8,433, which is 0.80 times the floor. The answer is to cut your hours by standardizing the build, or to sell it as a fixed-scope package, as the productized service pricing framework describes. Time saved by staff on $25 an hour creates a small value pool, and a decent alternative shrinks it further.
How sensitive is the fee to each assumption?
The two tables below rerun Example A, changing two estimates at a time.
Table 7. Example A fee by probability of success and capture share (CEOtudent analysis; 8.01% discount rate, 3 years)
| Probability of success | Capture share 15% | Capture share 25% | Capture share 35% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 40% | $21,986 | $26,644 | $31,301 |
| 60% | $28,479 | $37,466 | $46,452 |
| 80% | $34,972 | $48,287 | $61,602 |
Table 8. Example A fee by discount rate and duration (CEOtudent analysis; 60% probability, 25% capture share)
| Discount rate | 1 year | 3 years | 5 years |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6.00% | $16,887 | $38,680 | $58,076 |
| 8.01% | $16,666 | $37,466 | $55,295 |
| 12.00% | $16,250 | $35,263 | $50,420 |
Across the probability and capture-share grid the fee ranges 2.8 times, from $21,986 to $61,602; the top cell exceeds the $60,000 budget, so Line 7 would cap it. Cutting the benefit period from three years to one reduces the fee by 55.5%, below the $21,000 floor. Doubling the discount rate from 6% to 12% moves the three-year fee by only 8.8%. Spend negotiation time on how long the benefit lasts, how likely the project is to work and how much of the result is yours, not on the second decimal of the discount rate.
How much of the value should you capture?
There is no primary research establishing a correct capture share. Practitioner writing often repeats rules such as “charge 10 to 20% of the value”; CEOtudent found no peer-reviewed study or official dataset behind any specific percentage, so none is presented here as a finding.
What follows is a CEOtudent editorial range: 10% to 30% of the differentiation value, on top of the reference price, starting near 20 to 25% for a new client. It rests on reasoning, not research:
- Your estimates will be wrong in ways you cannot yet see. A share well below half leaves the client better off even if your estimate is generous.
- The client carries costs the worksheet ignores: staff time, change management, disruption risk.
- The client must clearly prefer you to the alternative. At 25%, it keeps three quarters of the advantage you create.
- Buyers judge prices against reference points. The fairness evidence is summarized in how to raise your rates without losing clients.
- Gain-sharing meets resistance. A 2024 encyclopedia entry on B2B gain-sharing notes “customer resistance to these arrangements despite their economic benefits” (abstract only).
Move toward the top with a measured track record on this outcome and a weak alternative; toward the bottom with a new client, a new kind of outcome, or a finance team that audits every line. If you sell in tiers, the good-better-best packaging guide covers how to design and test them.
When should you not use value-based pricing?
The hub guide sets three conditions: the outcome is measurable, attributable to your work, and agreed in advance. The worksheet adds tests you can check on paper:
- No baseline. If the client cannot say what the metric is today, any value claim becomes a later dispute.
- An outcome you do not control. If the result depends mainly on the client’s sales team or the market, set attribution honestly. As an editorial rule of thumb, below about a third, sell your work, not the result.
- A value pool smaller than your floor. Example B at 40% realization is the pattern; use a fixed price or a retainer instead.
- A strong alternative. If software or an internal team delivers most of the value, your premium is small.
- Outcomes that cannot be priced without invented numbers, such as morale or “strategic clarity”.
- Rules that restrict outcome-linked fees. Some professions and procurement processes limit fees that depend on results; check yours first.
When AI tools do much of the delivery, the billing and disclosure questions are covered in what to charge for AI-assisted work.
What this does not mean
- It does not mean charging a percentage of revenue. Line 2 converts revenue to profit first; skipping it overstates value 3 to 44 times at the operating margins in Table 3.
- It does not mean the fee must depend on results. A value-based fee can be fixed and paid in advance. Making part of it conditional is a separate decision about sharing risk.
- It does not produce the “true” value. It produces a range and a written set of assumptions both sides can test.
- It does not guarantee more than hourly billing, as Example B shows.
- The performance evidence is not proof of cause. It rests on self-reported, cross-sectional surveys.
The CEO and the student in this formula
The CEO owns the definition and the decision. Line 1 is a leadership act: you choose the outcome you will be accountable for, and how it is measured. Lines 6 and 7 are yours alone. Set the capture share and walk-away price before the sales call, write them down, and do not let the meeting renegotiate the floor.
The student runs the experiment. Each proposal is a test with a written hypothesis. Keep a pricing log, one row per proposal: the eight lines, the quoted fee, won or lost, the stated reason, and the measured outcome at six and twelve months. After every five proposals, compare estimates with results. If outcomes keep landing below your probability line, lower it; if you win almost everything, your capture share is probably too low. A price is a hypothesis about value, revised with evidence; the CEO-style repricing audit in pricing your expertise in the AI era applies the same discipline to your whole offer.
A pre-send checklist
A value-based proposal should pass all eight checks before it goes out:
- One outcome metric, with baseline, target, window and data source.
- Revenue converted to profit at a contribution margin that fits the industry range in Table 3.
- Time savings at a loaded hourly cost, with a realization rate agreed with the client.
- Benefit period stated; discount rate from the client or a cited industry figure; risk in the probability line only.
- Attribution share written down, with the reason.
- Next-best alternative named, with its price and expected value.
- Fee between your floor and the lower of the client’s budget and its economic value.
- The client’s expected net gain with you against the alternative, shown in dollars.
Frequently asked questions
What is a value-based price, in one line?
The price of the client’s best alternative plus an agreed share of the extra value you deliver over it, measured as risk-adjusted, discounted profit.
What share of the value should a consultant charge?
No study establishes one. This article uses a CEOtudent editorial range of 10% to 30% of the differentiation value.
Which margin converts extra revenue into profit?
The client’s own contribution margin on additional sales. As a check, it should usually fall between the industry’s operating and gross margins: for listed US software companies in January 2026, 32.98% to 71.72%.
Which discount rate fits?
The client’s cost of capital, or an industry figure: Damodaran’s January 2026 estimates run from 6.19% to 9.34% across the industries in Table 3. Keep risk out of the discount rate.
How are hours saved valued?
Hours saved x wage x a benefits multiplier (about 1.31 for full-time US private-industry workers in June 2026) x the share of freed hours that become real savings.
What if the client will not share margins or baseline data?
Then the worksheet cannot be completed honestly. Offer a short paid diagnostic to establish the baseline, or price the work as a fixed-scope project.
This article is general information, not financial, tax or legal advice.
Sources
- Aswath Damodaran, NYU Stern School of Business. Operating and Net Margins by Sector (US), data as of January 2026 (margin dataset, spreadsheet and web table).
- Aswath Damodaran, NYU Stern School of Business. Cost of Equity and Capital (US), data as of January 2026 (wacc dataset, spreadsheet and web table).
- Aswath Damodaran, NYU Stern School of Business. Damodaran Online data page, note on the most recent update (January 9, 2026).
- U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2025, Table 1: National employment and wage data by occupation. News release USDL-26-0725, 15 May 2026.
- U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Employer Costs for Employee Compensation, June 2026. News release USDL-26-1494, 9 September 2026.
- Fabiani, S. et al. (2005). The pricing behaviour of firms in the euro area: new survey evidence. European Central Bank Working Paper No. 535, Eurosystem Inflation Persistence Network.
- Hall, S., Walsh, M. and Yates, A. (1997). How do UK companies set prices? Bank of England Working Paper No. 67.
- Greenslade, J. and Parker, M. (2010). New insights into price-setting behaviour in the United Kingdom. Bank of England Working Paper No. 395.
- Hinterhuber, A. (2004). Towards value-based pricing: an integrative framework for decision making. Industrial Marketing Management, 33, 765-778.
- Hinterhuber, A. (2008). Customer value-based pricing strategies: why companies resist. Journal of Business Strategy, 29(4), 41-50 (abstract only).
- Steinbrenner, F. and Turčínková, J. (2021). Industry-specific factors impeding the implementation of value-based pricing. European Journal of Business Science and Technology, 7(1), 27-46 (cited for its summary of Hinterhuber and Bertini, 2011).
- Liozu, S. M. and Hinterhuber, A. (2013). Pricing orientation, pricing capabilities, and firm performance. Management Decision, 51(3), 594-614 (abstract only).
- Ingenbleek, P. T. M., Frambach, R. T. and Verhallen, T. M. M. (2013). Best practices for new product pricing: impact on market performance and price level under different conditions. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 30(3), 560-573 (abstract only).
- Keränen, J., Salonen, A. and Terho, H. (2024). Gain-sharing arrangements in value-based pricing: economic and behavioral perspectives. In A. Hinterhuber (Ed.), Elgar Encyclopedia of Pricing, pp. 86-92. Edward Elgar (abstract only).
Table 1 reproduces survey figures as printed. Tables 2, 5 and 6 are CEOtudent editorial frameworks; Tables 3, 4, 7 and 8 are CEOtudent analyses of the sources named under them, recomputed with a script. All worked-example inputs not attributed to a source are illustrative assumptions. Deliberately not used: any “right” capture share presented as a research finding, including the often repeated “charge 10 to 20% of value” rule, because no primary study supporting it was found. The 44%, 37% and 17% literature figures are attributed to the secondary summary in which they were read, not to the original 2011 chapter, which was not opened.
This content was compiled with the support of AI following in-depth research, then written and prepared for publication by the CEOtudent editorial team.
This post is also available in:
