\n| HLE<\/td>\n | Multiple-choice \/ equivalence grading<\/td>\n | Yes<\/td>\n | None<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n Source: Kalai, Nachum, Vempala and Zhang, “Why Language Models Hallucinate,” arXiv preprint 2509.04664v1, September 2025, Table 2. Our tally of their rows: 9 of 10 use binary grading; 9 of 10 give no credit for abstention; 0 of 10 give full credit for a calibrated abstention. WildBench’s rubric offers only partial credit, and the authors note its 1-to-10 scale may still score an abstention below a confident but hallucinated answer.<\/em><\/p>\nThat last line in the note is the whole problem in miniature. Even the one benchmark that does not use binary grading may still reward a confident falsehood over an honest “I don’t know.”<\/p>\n The authors’ proposed fix is not a new hallucination benchmark. It is to change the scoring of the benchmarks that already dominate leaderboards, by stating a confidence threshold in the instructions: answer only if you are more than t confident, since mistakes are penalised t\/(1-t) points, correct answers earn 1 point, and “I don’t know” earns 0.<\/p>\n A note on that formula, for readers who check arithmetic. The preprint lists natural values as t = 0.5 (penalty 1), t = 0.75 (penalty 2) and t = 0.9 (penalty 9). Applying the paper’s own stated formula, t\/(1-t), gives 1 for t = 0.5 and 9 for t = 0.9, both matching, but 3 for t = 0.75, not 2. The parenthetical for the middle value is inconsistent with the formula it accompanies. This is a small slip in an otherwise careful preprint and it changes nothing about the argument. We flag it because it is exactly the kind of derived number this article is telling you to recompute, and the lesson does not stop at papers from frontier labs. The observation applies to version 1 of the arXiv preprint dated 4 September 2025; later published versions may differ.<\/p>\n <\/span>The bluff rate: an original column<\/span><\/h2>\nHere is where the theory becomes measurable.<\/p>\n OpenAI released SimpleQA in November 2024, a benchmark of 4,326 short fact-seeking questions written to be hard for GPT-4o, each with a single indisputable answer. Its grading has three outcomes rather than two: correct, incorrect, and not attempted, where “not attempted” covers answers that do not fully give the reference answer, including outright “I don’t know.”<\/p>\n That third category is what makes the dataset useful here, because it separates two things that binary benchmarks fuse: not knowing, and pretending to know.<\/p>\n The published table reports correct, not attempted, and incorrect for eight models. It does not report the ratio that matters most for a working professional. If a model is going to fail you, what does that failure look like? Does it tell you it does not know, or does it hand you something false with a straight face?<\/p>\n That is a single division: incorrect divided by the sum of incorrect and not attempted. We computed it for every row.<\/p>\n \n\n\n| Model<\/th>\n | Correct (%)<\/th>\n | Not attempted (%)<\/th>\n | Incorrect (%)<\/th>\n | Bluff rate (%)<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n | \n\n| GPT-4o-mini<\/td>\n | 8.6<\/td>\n | 0.9<\/td>\n | 90.5<\/td>\n | 99.0<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | \n| GPT-4o<\/td>\n | 38.2<\/td>\n | 1.0<\/td>\n | 60.8<\/td>\n | 98.4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | \n| OpenAI o1-preview<\/td>\n | 42.7<\/td>\n | 9.2<\/td>\n | 48.1<\/td>\n | 83.9<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | \n| OpenAI o1-mini<\/td>\n | 8.1<\/td>\n | 28.5<\/td>\n | 63.4<\/td>\n | 69.0<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | \n| Claude-3.5-sonnet (2024-06-20)<\/td>\n | 28.9<\/td>\n | 35.0<\/td>\n | 36.1<\/td>\n | 50.8<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | \n| Claude-3-opus (2024-02-29)<\/td>\n | 23.5<\/td>\n | 39.6<\/td>\n | 36.9<\/td>\n | 48.2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | \n| Claude-3-haiku (2024-03-07)<\/td>\n | 5.1<\/td>\n | 75.3<\/td>\n | 19.6<\/td>\n | 20.7<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | \n| Claude-3-sonnet (2024-02-29)<\/td>\n | 5.7<\/td>\n | 75.0<\/td>\n | 19.3<\/td>\n | 20.5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n CEOtudent editorial framework. The correct, not-attempted and incorrect columns are reported verbatim from OpenAI, “Measuring short-form factuality in large language models,” arXiv preprint 2411.04368, Table 3. The bluff rate is our calculation: incorrect \/ (incorrect + not attempted), that is, the share of non-correct responses in which the model asserted a wrong answer rather than abstaining. Every row of the source table sums to 100.0, which we verified. Models and dates are as evaluated in late 2024 and current systems will differ; the column is included to show the spread in abstention behaviour, not to rank vendors today.<\/em><\/p>\nTwo readings, and the second is the important one.<\/p>\n The obvious reading is the spread. GPT-4o-mini, when it does not know, tells you anyway 99 times out of 100. Claude-3-sonnet, in the same situation, declines four times out of five. That is a 4.8x difference in how failure presents itself.<\/p>\n The reading that matters more: bluff rate is largely decoupled from accuracy. GPT-4o-mini answered 8.6% of questions correctly. Claude-3-haiku answered 5.1% correctly. A 3.5 percentage point difference in competence, and a 78 point difference in how they behave when out of their depth. These two models know almost equally little. One tells you so and one does not.<\/p>\n This is precisely what the hallucination paper predicts. Abstention behaviour is not a byproduct of capability. It is a separate, trained disposition, set by what the training and evaluation process rewarded. And because nine of ten leading benchmarks pay nothing for abstention, the incentive gradient points one way.<\/p>\n The practical consequence: you cannot infer trustworthiness from benchmark scores. A model at the top of a leaderboard may be the one most likely to hand you a fabricated citation, because leaderboard position and willingness to bluff are produced by the same pressure.<\/p>\n | |